SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SToP AND FRISK-EVIDENCE SEIZED INCIDENT TO AN ARREST THAT Is BASED UPON A POLICE OFFICER'S
COMPUTER RECORD THAT FAILED TO INDICATE THAT THE
ARREST WARRANT HAD BEEN QUASHED, DUE TO AN ERROR COMMITTED BY COURT PERSONNEL, Is

WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE

GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE-Arizona

v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person shall be subject to an unreasonable governmental search or seizure.' The Fourth Amendment additionally guarantees that warrants will be valid only if they are based
upon probable cause and described with particular specificity.2
The text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify the remedy
that is to be granted if its commands are violated.' The United
States Supreme Court has endorsed the exclusionary rule, which
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 Id. The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Id.
The term "search" refers to an infringement of a privacy expectation that is considered by society to be reasonable. 79 CJ.S. Searches and Seizures § 7, at 18 (citing
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 465 (1985) (holding that an undercover police
officer's purchase of allegedly obscene material did not constitute a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment); United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111, 120-21 (1984) (ruling that it was not unreasonable for federal agents to seize and search a suspicious
package containing a white, powdery substance)).
A seizure of property refers to a "meaningful interference with an individual's

possessory interest in such property." 79 CJ.S. Searches and Seizures § 8, at 20 (citing
Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., No. 88 C 7654, 1993 WL 199050 at *1, 2 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(holding that qualified immunity is not available to defendants because the law was
well settled with regard to the Fourth Amendment's applicability to the defendants'
seizure of the plaintiffs' trailer home); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1968) (ruling that a seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer in some way
restricts the liberty of a citizen either by physical means or a show of authority)).
A search is distinct from a seizure because a search interferes with an individual's
privacy interest, whereas a seizure takes away an individual's dominion over his property or person. 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 8, at 20-21 (citing Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 578 (1st Cir.
1990)).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The legislative history of the Fourth Amendment
does not shed much light on the intended scope of the Amendment's commands.
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1371
(1983). The debate as to the Amendment's passage was limited primarily to the text's
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provides that evidence obtained from an unreasonable search or
seizure shall be inadmissible in criminal prosecutions.4
The Supreme Court has ruled that the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct; it is not to deter
errors of judges and magistrates. 5 Over the years, the Court has
phraseology and revealed little about whether the Fourth Amendment was intended
to mandate the suppression of illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 1371 & n.34.
4 Daniel S. Schneider, Comment, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of State ConstitutionalLaw, 1987 Wis. L. Ruv. 377, 393 (stating that the notion that
"the exclusionary rule is nothing more than a judicially created remedy is premised
on the belief that when a government agent illegally invades a person's privacy, the
wrong has been fully accomplished"); see also Milton A. Lowenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 25 (1980); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655, 660 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is an integral element of the Fourth Amendment and, as such, its application in state court is
justified).
There has been much debate, confusion, and dispute as to the status of evidence
obtained as the result of an unreasonable search or seizure. See Stewart, supra note 3,
at 1366 (commenting that the exclusionary rule appears in hindsight to be "a bit jerrybuilt-like a roller coaster track constructed while the roller coaster sped along");
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not . .. Run
Smooth", 1966 U. ILL. L. Rv. 255, 255 (remarking that "[n]o area of the law has more
bedeviled the judiciary, from the Justices of the Supreme Court down to the
magistrate").
Many legal commentators have argued for the complete abolition of the exclusionary rule. See generally Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctionsfor GovernmentalMisconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1982); Malcolm R. Wilkey, A Call for
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDIcATURE 351 (1979); John G. Miles, Jr., Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule
Mapp v. Ohio, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 9 (1977); Harvey R. Levin, An Alternative to the
Exclusionary Rule for Fourth Amendment Violations, 58 JUDICATURE 74 (1974).
Often, the issue most commonly before the courts is whether the evidence obtained from an unlawful arrest is to be deemed the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
WAYNE R

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A

TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 11.4, at 612 (1978) (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
More specifically, courts question whether the derivative or secondary evidence that
naturally results from such an arrest is tainted. Id.; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co., v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391, 392 (1920) (holding as invalid government subpoenas that requested evidence that had been unlawfully seized by law enforcement officials); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (rejecting a "but for"
test by stating that not all evidence that would not have otherwise resulted but for the
police's illegal actions is deemed to be "fruit of the poisonous tree").
5 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (commenting that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect"); Nardone,308 U.S. at 340 (acknowledging that the upholding of a
citizen's right to privacy is a concern of the exclusionary rule); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 755 (1970) (propounding that the exclusionary rule fails to serve as a deterrent for illegal searches
and seizures committed by the police). See generally Myron W. Orfield, Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1016 (1987) (arguing that the exclusionary rule is not a deterrent for
police misconduct).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:866

narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule.6 Specifically, the
Court has fashioned what is now commonly known as the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, in which evidence that is
seized by officers in good faith reliance on a search warrant that is
subsequently found to be unsupported by probable cause will be
admissible at trial.7 Although this exception has been continually
upheld and expanded with every Supreme Court decision, it has
not been without its fair share of criticism. 8
The United States Supreme Court, in its recent decision of
Arizona v. Evans,9 addressed the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule where a police officer unknowingly relies upon an erroneous computer record that indicates that an arrest warrant is
outstanding for a particular individual.1 0 Specifically, the Court
ruled that evidence obtained as a result of an outstanding arrest
warrant that was erroneously listed as valid in the records of a police computer is within the scope of the good faith exception to the
The deterrent rationale behind the exclusionary rule was based on the theory
that the suppression of illegally obtained evidence would deter law enforcement officials in the future from seizing evidence in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975) (quoting Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960)
(abolishing the "silver platter" doctrine that allowed federal judicial use of evidence
seized by state agents in violation of the Constitution). See generally Bradley C. Canon,
The Exclusionary Rule: Have CriticsProven That It Doesn'tDeter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398
(1979); Fred E.Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogationand Confessions, 52 Nw. U.
L. REv. 77 (1957); Wayne R. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule--Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1965);
Wayne R. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule - Part II:
Defining the Norms and Trainingthe Police, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391 (1965); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRim. L., CRIMINOLOGY, &
POLICE Sci. 255 (1961); Steven R.Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents
Proven That it is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979)).
6 See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1389 and accompanying text.
7 Leon, 468 U.S. at 900, 913, 926.
8 See Ralph E. Dejong, Note, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Ruk 57 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 112, 136 (1981) (arguing that courts should teach police
officers the requirements of the Fourth Amendment rather than adopt the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule); John R. Hoopes, Note, The Proposed Good Faith
Test for Fourth Amendment Exclusion Compared to the § 1983 Good FaithDefense: Problems
and Prospects,20 ARiz. L. REv. 915, 951 (1978) (commenting that the Court's application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule could focus disproportionately on a police officer's assessment of the facts); Steven KL Sharpe & John E.
Fennelly, Comment, Massachusetts v. Sheppard: When the Keeper Leads the Flock
Astray-A Case of Good Faith or HarmlessError?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 665, 684 (1984)
(noting that when a court focuses solely on the conduct of a police officer, attention
is diverted from the judge or magistrate who committed the actual error).
9 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
10 Id. at 1189.

1996]

NOTE

869

exclusionary rule.1" The Court noted that because the exclusionary issue was separate and distinct from the issue of whether a
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, the Court would limit
its decision to the applicability of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 2
In the winter of 1991, Isaac Evans was stopped by Officer
Bryan Sargent, a Phoenix police officer, for a traffic violation.1 "
When Officer Sargent asked Evans for his driver's license, Evans
stated that he did not possess one because it had been suspended. 4 Officer Sargent then entered Evans's name into the
computerized records terminal located in his police vehicle. 5 As a
result, Officer Sargent learned that there was an outstanding warrant for Evans's arrest. 6 Accordingly, Officer Sargent placed Evans
under arrest; he experienced difficulty, however, when he attempted to handcuff Evans. 7 Officer Sargent then asked Evans to
relax his hand.' As Evans relaxed his hand, he dropped a handrolled cigarette. 9 Because Officer Sargent and another officer at
the scene concluded that the cigarette smelled of marijuana, the
officers proceeded to search Evans's car and located a bag of mari20
juana under a passenger's seat.
The State of Arizona charged Evans with possession of mari*
21
juana.
Subsequent to Evans's arrest, the justice court learned
11Id.
12 Id. at 1192-93.
13 Id. at 1188. Officer Sargent observed Evans operating his vehicle in the wrong
direction on a one-way street. Id.
14 Id.; State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 866 P.2d
869 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995). The record is not entirely clear as to
why Evans's license was initially suspended. See generally Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct.
1185 (1995); State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995);
State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995). At the evidentiary hearing, however, the Chief Clerk of
the Justice Court testified that the file she had on Evans contained four separate traffic tickets. See Tr. of Evidentiary Hr'g at 17, State v. Evans (No. 1 CA-CR 91-663).
15 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
16 Id. Additionally, Officer Sargent was able to confirm that Evans had a suspended license. Id. On December 13, 1990, a justice court issued a misdemeanor
warrant for Evans's arrest because Evans failed to appear for several traffic violations.
Evans, 836 P.2d at 1024-25.
17 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188; Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025.
18 Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025.
19 Id.; Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
20 Id. In addition, the officers also located cigarettes, rolling papers, and marijuana residue in the purse of Evans's passenger. Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025.
21 Evans, 115 S. Ct at 1188. Under Arizona law, possession of marijuana is a class
six felony. Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025. The complaint filed against Evans alleged that
"Evans had knowingly possessed or used less than one pound of marijuana," in viola-
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that the outstanding warrant that Officer Sargent relied upon had
been quashed seventeen days after Evans's original arrest warrant
had been issued.22 Evans subsequently filed a motion to suppress
the evidence seized by the officers. 23 At the evidentiary hearing,
Evans argued that because his arrest resulted from a warrant that
had been quashed seventeen days prior to his arrest, the marijuana
evidence obtained as a. result of the arrest had to be suppressed
because it was the "fruit of an unlawful arrest."24 In addition, Evans
refuted the State's argument that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule was applicable, claiming that it was police error
25
and not judicial error that resulted in his arrest.
The trial court determined that because the State had failed to
record the quashed warrant, Evans's motion to suppress had to be
granted. 6 In its ruling, the trial court relied exclusively on State v.
tion of ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405 (1989) (classifying marijuana possession as a
class six felony); § 13-3401 (describing what constitutes marijuana); and § 13-3418
(stating that a conviction under this chapter may make the person convicted ineligible for public benefits). Id.
22 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188; Evans, 836 P.2d at 1024-25. On December 12, 1990,
Evans had his arrest warrant quashed when he appeared before ajudge pro tempore.
Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025. Ajudge pro tempore is ajudge who is appointed for a term
or a portion of a term to act and exercise all of the functions of the regular judge.
BLACK'S LAw DICTFIONARY 841 (6th ed. 1990). In the present case, the judge pro
tempore entered the notation of "quash warrant" in Evans's file. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at
1188.
23 Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025. At the suppression hearing, Officer Sargent testified
that he would not have arrested Evans had he not learned from the computer inquiry
that there was an outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant in Evans's name. Evans,
866 P.2d at 870. In addition, the Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified as to the
standard procedure followed by the court when quashing a warrant. Evans, 115 S.Ct.
at 1188. Under the standard procedure for quashing a warrant, one of the justice
court clerks telephones the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, specifically the warrant
section, to notify it that a warrant has been quashed. Id.; Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025. A
representative from the Sheriff's Office then removes the notation from the computer records. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1188. The telephoning justice clerk will then make
a notation in the individual's file that indicates which clerk telephoned the Sheriffs
Office and the person from the warrant section who took the call. Id. At Evans's
suppression hearing, the Chief Clerk testified that Evans's file did not have a notation
that indicated that the aforementioned procedures had taken place. Id. In addition,
a records clerk employed by the Sheriffs Office testified and stated that there was no
record of a telephone call from the clerk's office indicating that Evans's misdemeanor
arrest warrant had been quashed. Id.
24 Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1188.
25 Id. At the close of testimony, Evans further argued that the court should suppress the evidence because "'the purposes of the exclusionary rule would be served
here by making the clerks for the court, or the clerk for the Sheriffs office, whoever is
responsible for this mistake, to be more careful about making sure that warrants are
removed from records."' Id. (quotation omitted).
26 Id. The trial court concluded that a factual determination as to whether court
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Greene. 7 The trial court concluded that the facts of Greene were
analogous to Evans's situation. 28 As a result of there being no admissible evidence against Evans, the State filed a motion to dismiss
without prejudice, which was subsequently granted by the trial
court.

29

On its appeal, the State argued that the trial court had abused
its discretion in ruling that the evidence should be suppressed."0
The Arizona Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, agreed
with the State and reversed the ruling of the lower court, holding
that in granting Evans's motion to suppress the evidence, the trial
court had abused its discretion.3 1 The court of appeals began its
analysis by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. 2 The
court stated that it would reverse the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress only if the State could show that the trial court had
abused its discretion.33
The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed with the State that the
facts of the case were distinguishable from the facts in Greene.
staff or law enforcement employees were responsible for the error was irrelevant. Evans, 866 P.2d at 870.
27 Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025 (citing State v. Greene, 783 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989)). In Greene, Cecil Bobby Greene was stopped by an officer of the South Tucson
Police Department for a traffic violation. Greene, 783 P.2d at 829. Upon doing a
records check, the officer learned that an outstanding arrest warrant for failure to
appear for a traffic violation existed in Greene's name. Id. Greene was subsequently
arrested. Id. While handcuffing Greene, the officer discovered narcotics in Greene's
pockets. Id. It was later learned that Greene's arrest warrant had been quashed eight
months earlier. Id. Greene successfully moved to suppress the evidence seized during his arrest. Id.
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
granting Greene's motion to suppress. Id. The appellate court noted that there was
no evidence offered to the trial court indicating that the police department was not at
fault in having the warrant noted in its computer system. Id. at 830. The court concluded that by deeming the evidence inadmissible, the "ends of the exclusionary rule
would be furthered in an appreciable way." Id. The appellate court propounded that
the holding would serve to deter the South Tucson Police Department from negligently or deliberately maintaining up-to-date paperwork or computer entries, which
would expose innocent persons to what could be a wrongful arrest. Id.
28 Evans, 836 P.2d at 1025.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1028. The appellate court also remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
32 Id. at 1025.
33 Id. (citing State v. Prince, 772 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Ariz. 1989); State v. Coats, 797
P.2d 693, 697-98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)). The Evans court noted that on a motion to
suppress evidence, it was to "view the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling," and that the ruling would not be disturbed "absent clear and manifest error."
Id. (citing State v. Gerlaugh, 654 P.2d 800, 803 (Ariz. 1982)).
34 Id. at 1026-27.
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The appellate court reasoned that unlike the case in Greene, there
was no evidence in the present case of negligence committed by
the arresting officers or the Phoenix Police Department. 35 In determining that the trial court had overgeneralized the deterrence
rationale behind the exclusionary rule,3 6 the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the arresting officers' actions had been objectively reasonable so as to have been deemed consistent with the
exclusionary rule's good faith exception.3 7 The appellate court
known that
recognized that the arresting officers could not have
38
quashed.
been
previously
had
Evans's arrest warrant
In explaining Arizona's good faith exception statute, 39 the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the statute was inapplicable
to the conduct of justice court employees or Sheriffs Office employees.' As a result, the appellate court remanded the case, reversing the decision of the trial court and ruling that the trial court
had abused its discretion in excluding the evidence seized incident
to Evans's arrest.4 1
35 Id. at 1026. The court hypothesized that the arresting officers would have been
negligent had they not arrested Evans based on their knowledge of an outstanding
arrest warrant existing in his name. Id. The appellate court noted that the State
presented evidence indicating that employees of the justice court, not the Phoenix
Police Department, had been negligent because the justice court failed to notify the
Sheriff's Office that the outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant for Evans had been
quashed. Id. at 1026-27.
36 Id. at 1027. The Evans court reiterated the United States Supreme Court's view
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct rather than
to punish judges and magistrates. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916
(1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974)). The appellate court added
that this deterrence rationale was not meant to be extended to justice court employees or employees of the Sheriff's Office who were not directly associated with the
Phoenix Police Department and/or its arresting officers. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at
916). At the evidentiary hearing, ajustice court employee testified that errors similar
to what had occurred in Evans's case occurred approximately once every three or four
years. Id. at 1024.
37 Id. at 1027 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20).
38 Id.
39 See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1989) (providing that evidence "seized by a
peace officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation" shall not be
suppressed); Evans, 836 P.2d at 1027.
40 Evans, 836 P.2d at 1028 (citing Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1989)).
41 Id. The dissent referred to State v. Peterson, 830 P.2d 854, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 465 (1992), as having cited numerous cases involving
invalid warrants and police computer entries in which the courts found the arrest and
subsequent search invalid. Id. (Clabome, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (D. Nev. 1975); People v. Ramirez, 668 P.2d 761, 768
(Cal. 1983); Pesci v. State, 420 So.2d 380, 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); People v.
Joseph, 470 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); People v. Lawson, 456 N.E.2d 170,
175 (111. App. Ct. 1983); People v. Decuir, 405 N.E.2d 891, 892-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980);
People v., Jennings, 430 N.E.2d 1282, 1284-85 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Watson, 474
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Vacating the appellate court's opinion, the Arizona Supreme
Court ruled that it was immaterial as to which department had
failed to update the computerized records in a timely fashion because an outstanding erroneous arrest warrant violates society's
fundamental liberty interest.4" Accordingly, the court determined
that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding that
there had been a gap in proof as to whether there was ever a
phone call made by a justice clerk to the Sheriff's Office concerning the quashed warrant.4 3 The supreme court emphasized that
the arrest of Evans, which was based solely on an erroneous computer record, was plainly illegal because the arrest was procured
without a warrant. 44
The Arizona Supreme Court stated that it was irrelevant that
the arresting officer had acted in good faith, and it questioned the
N.Y.S.2d 978, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); People v. Lent, 460 N.Y.S.2d 369, 369-70
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983); State v. Trenidad, 595 P.2d 957, 958-59 (Wash. Ct. App.
(1979)). The dissent concluded that the task of updating records lies with the police
department and charged that the police department's failure to comply with such
responsibility "should not overcome a defendant's constitutional right to a valid warrant or probable cause before an arrest and search." Id. Finally, the dissent recognized that a growing problem existed as a result of more and more police
departments relying on electronically recorded and disseminated criminal files. Id.
(citingJoseph,470 N.E.2d at 1306).
42 Evans, 866 P.2d at 870-72.
43 Id. at 871. The supreme court stated that the appellate court's reliance on
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), was unfounded because the issue in Tucker
dealt with alleged Miranda violations. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)). A Miranda violation occurs where a person who is interrogated by law enforcement officers is not warned of the following: 1) that "he has a right to remain
silent"; 2) that "any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him"; 3)
that "he has a right to the presence of an attorney"; and 4) that "if he cannot afford
an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 988 (6th ed. 1990). The Evans court also distinguished Evans's case from the facts in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Evans, 866
P.2d at 871 (citing State v. Peterson, 830 P.2d 854, 860-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 465 (1992)). The court noted that unlike the situation in Leon, there
was no warrant in existence at the time of Evans's arrest. Id.
The dissent disagreed with the majority, however, and stated that Evans's case fell
"squarely within the rule of Leon." Id. at 873 (Martone, J., dissenting). Refuting the
majority's reasoning that unlike Evans's case, the officers in Leon relied on a facially
valid warrant, the dissent reminded the majority that the officers who arrested Evans
did so in reliance upon facially valid computer information. Id. The dissent noted
that an officer who views an outstanding arrest warrant on a computer screen "is in
the same position as one who holds an arrest warrant in his hand." Id. The dissent
reasoned that in either situation, the warrant would be without effect, although it
would appear to be facially valid. Id.
44 Evans, 866 P.2d at 871. The supreme court noted Officer Sargent's testimony,
in which he stated that he would have had no reason to arrest Evans but for his computer inquiry, which indicated that there existed an outstanding arrest warrant in
Evans's name. Id. at 870.
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State's analysis of the good faith exception.4 5 The supreme court
commented that this case was not one involving a mere "technical
violation,"46 but, rather, one involving an arrest based on a nonexistent warrant. 47 The court noted that it was of paramount importance that the arrest was based on a nonexistent warrant, not a
warrant that was later determined to be invalid as a result of a good
faith mistake."
The supreme court stated that it hoped that the application of
the exclusionary rule to evidence seized as a result of an erroneous
arrest warrant caused by negligent record keeping would improve
the efficiency of those involved with keeping criminal justice
records up to date. 49 The court recognized that with technological
automation constantly on the rise, increasing invasions of modem
life would occur.5 ° The supreme court concluded that the exclusionary rule was a cost the public could not afford to be without.5
The supreme court ruled that the seized evidence must be
45 Id. at 871 (citing People v. Fields, 785 P.2d 611, 613 (Colo. 1990)). The court
reasoned that regardless of who was responsible for failing to note that Evans's arrest
warrant had been quashed, the fact that it was not noted was the result of "negligent
record keeping" and not the result of "a reasonable judgment error." Id. (citing
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925(C)(1) (West 1989)).
46 Id. (citing AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925(C) (2) (1989)). A "technical viola-

tion" is defined as reasonable good faith reliance upon either a subsequently invalidated statute, a warrant that is subsequently invalidated "due to a good faith mistake,"
or a controlling court precedent that is later overruled, with the exception of where
the overruling court orders a retroactive application of the new precedent. § 133925(C) (2).
47 Evans, 866 P.2d at 871 (citing Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925(C) (2) (1989)).
48 Id. (citing ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (C) (2)

(West 1989); United States v.

Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling that the holding in Leon is inapplicable to invalid warrantless searches)). Unlike the court of appeals and its dissent,
the Arizona Supreme Court did not see the need to draw a distinction between mistakes committed by court employees and law enforcement personnel. Id.
49 Id. at 872. In refuting the dissent's opinion, the supreme court stressed the
importance of an arrest warrant, in that its execution goes against the important concept of human liberty. Id. The dissent emphasized, however, that the exclusionary
rule was applicable to "police misconduct, not judicial department error." Id. at 873
(Martone, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 872.
51 Id. The dissent proffered that the majority was incorrect in stating that the exclusionary rule applied to all unlawful searches. Id. (Martone, J., dissenting). The
dissent noted that the exclusionary rule was a "'judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' Id. (quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1972)). The dissent further noted that because
the rationale behind the exclusionary rule was to "'deter future unlawful police conduct,"' its applicability was narrower than that of unlawful searches. Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347).
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suppressed, regardless of which department committed the error.5"
Accordingly, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the appellate
court's decision.5 3 The United States Supreme Court subsequenly
granted certiorari 54 to decide whether evidence seized as a result of
an arrest that was based upon an erroneous computer record was
protected by the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 55
The Court determined that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision appeared to rest primarily on a federal constitutional issue,
and it ruled that it had jurisdiction to review the state court's decision.56 In reversing the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court held that evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as a result of an erroneous outstanding arrest warrant that existed in computer
records, due to clerical mistakes committed by court employees,
was within the scope of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.5 7
The exclusionary rule was formulated over eighty years ago in
Weeks v. United States, 8 in which the Supreme Court ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in federal court.59 In Weeks, the accused asserted that the
government had illegally entered his home without a warrant and
had seized evidence to be used against him in a criminal proceed52

Id. at 872.

Id. at 870. The dissent reasoned that if it was not clear which department was
responsible for the quashed warrant still being noted as valid, the case should be
remanded for findings on that issue. Id. at 874 (Martone,J., dissenting). The dissent
explained that rather than applying the exclusionary rule to any type of error, the
exclusionary rule should be limited to police misconduct because of the high costs
that are involved when evidence is suppressed. Id. The dissenting justices asserted
that the problem of computer errors would best be solved by education, training, and
high standards. Id. The dissent articulated that by applying the exclusionary rule to
judicial error, its application would be purposeless and it would defeat the truthfinding process, free the guilty, and generate "disrespect for the law and the administration of justice with no offsetting benefits." Id. (citing State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593,
684 (Ariz. 1992)).
54 Arizona v. Evans, 114 S. Ct. 2131 (1994).
55 Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 1189 (1995).
56 Id. at 1190.
57 Id. at 1189. The Court declined to review Evans's claim that his arrest violated
the Fourth Amendment. Id. n.1 (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 357 n.13 (1987)
(stating that the issue the Court would be reviewing would be a determination of
whether a police officer acted in good faith reliance on an apparently invalid statute;
the issue would not be whether such a statute was unconstitutional); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984)).
58 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
53

59 Id. at 398.
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ing. 6° justice Day delivered the unanimous opinion in Weeks, proclaiming that if evidence could be obtained and used against a
citizen in such a way as to constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure, then the Fourth Amendment would be without meaning
and might as well be eliminated from the Constitution.6 1
Almost fifty years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,6 2 the Supreme Court
extended the Weeks ruling to include the decision that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment be inadmissible in
state courts as well as federal courts.6 3 In Mapp, the police forcibly
entered the appellant's home without showing a warrant.6 4 As a
result, the police were able to obtain evidence that would be used
against Mapp in convicting her of possession of obscene material.6 5
In Mapp, the Court reasoned that the ruling in Wolf v. Colorado,66 which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not mandate that the exclusionary rule be appli60

Id. at 387. Weeks filed a petition to retrieve his personal property, claiming that

the evidence seized was obtained in violation of the Missouri Constitution and, more
specifically, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id.
61 Id. at 393. The Court commented that the court's and its officials' attempt to
punish the guilty, however noble, could not be aided by the violation of citizens' constitutional rights-principles that have been established through years of suffering.
Id. The Court noted prior criminal cases that relied upon the doctrine that a court
was not to inquire as to the manner in which evidence was obtained. Id. at 394-96
(citing Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904); People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636,
638 (N.Y. 1903)). The Court further recounted that if the evidence was competent, it
would be admissible. Id. The Court, however, refuted the decision in People v. Adams
because unlike the situation in Weeks, a legal warrant was at issue in Adams. Id. at 396.
The Weeks Court concluded that the evidence seized from Weeks's home was obtained
by a federal official "acting under color of his office" and, therefore, was seized in
direct violation of Weeks's constitutional rights. Id. at 398.
62 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
63 Id. at 654-55. The Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v. United
States to demonstrate that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were applicable to all
government invasions. Id. at 646 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)). The Mapp Court stated:
"It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property ....
It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen .... "
Id. at 646-47 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630, 635).
64 Id. at 644, 645. On the day of the illegal entry, the police had initially demanded that Mapp allow them into her home. Id. at 644. Mapp, however, upon the
advice of her attorney, refused to allow the officers in unless they presented a search
warrant. Id. Approximately three hours later, the police returned and forcibly entered Mapp's home. Id. No evidence of a search warrant was presented at trial. Id. at
645.
65 Id.
66 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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cable to state courts, was not controlling because the decision in
Wolf was fact sensitive.17 Refuting the contention that the Weeks ruling was merely evidentiary, the Court asserted that Weeks had been
and continued to be solidly viewed as being of constitutional origin.6 8 The Court determined that it had to close the last courtroom door admitting evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution.6 9
Recognizing that the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy is
applicable to the states, the Court proffered that it logically follows
that it is constitutionally necessary to apply the exclusionary rule to
state courts. 7 ' Acknowledging that constitutional protections and
freedoms all had the same goal-that no conviction is to result
from the admissibility of unconstitutional evidence-the Court
stressed that if the government did not obey its own laws, then further invitation to break them would surely be encouraged. 71 Concluding, the Court declared that to accomplish the true
administration ofjustice, an individual should be entitled to no less
than what the United States Constitution guarantees.7 2
67 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653, 654. The Court first noted that despite the Wofruling,
many of those states previously opposed to the application of the exclusionary rule
had adopted, at least in part, the ruling in Weeks. Id. at 651 (citing Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-232 app. (1960)).
With regard to prior Supreme Court decisions, the Mapp Court recounted the
decision in Elkins, that abolished the "silver platter" doctrine, which allowed the fed-

eral judiciary to use evidence seized in violation of the Constitution by state agents.
Id. at 653 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208). The Court noted that it had not previously
overturned Wolfbecause it wanted to give the states "'adequate opportunity to adopt
or reject the [Weeks] rule.'" Id. at 654 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134
(1954)).
68 Id. at 649.
69 Id. at 654-55.
70 Id. at 655-56. The Court noted that it had always held the rights of free speech,
free press, and a fair trial equally applicable to both the States and the federal system.
Id. at 656 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 548 (1961)). Additionally, the
Court remarked that it had only recently recognized that the rationale behind the
exclusionary rule was "'to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way--by removing the incentive to disregard it."' Id. (quoting
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217). In determining that a double standard existed, the Court
presented the following illustration:
Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally
seized, but a State's attorney across the street may, although he supposedly is operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same
Amendment. Thus the State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized,
serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is
bound to uphold.
Id. at 657.
71 Id. at 657, 659.
72 Id. at 660.
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Subsequent to the Mapp decision, the Court limited the scope
of the exclusionary rule in United States v. Calandra.73 The Calandra
Court held that the exclusionary rule did not extend to witnesses in
grand jury proceedings who refused to answer questions, because
such questions were based on evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.7' Noting that it was not the rationale behind
the exclusionary rule to redress the injuries of victims of unreasonable searches or seizures, the Court declared that the main purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct in an
attempt to safeguard a citizen's Fourth Amendment protections.75
The CalandraCourt noted that the exclusionary rule was a remedy
created by the courts in an attempt to effectuate the guarantee of
Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.76 Furthermore, the Court cautioned that it was to use the exclusionary rule
only in those instances where its remedial objectives could be most
effectively served.77
73 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
74 Id. at 353-54. In Calandra,federal agents investigating Calandra's place of business had a warrant to search such business for evidence connected to illegal gambling
operations. Id. at 340. During the course of the search, an agent seized evidence
connecting another person to criminal loansharking. Id. at 34041. The agent was
aware that this person had been the subject of a current investigation by the United
States Attorney's office. Id. Calandra subsequently filed a motion to suppress the
obtained evidence on the grounds that the search went beyond the scope of the warrant. Id. at 341.
The Court initially recognized that evidence obtained through an unreasonable
search or seizure could not be admitted in a state or federal judicial proceeding. Id.
at 347 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)). Next, the Court affirmed its prior reasoning that the exclusionary rule also applied to the fruits of illegally obtained evidence. Id. (citing
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 485, 487 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
75 Id. The Court noted that once someone's privacy was violated, no remedy could
repair the wound that had been inflicted. Id. (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 637 (1965)).
76 Id. at 348.
77 Id. With regard to the standing requirement, the Court stated that the utilization of the exclusionary rule was limited to those persons who were victims of an
unreasonable governmental search or seizure. Id. (citations omitted).
In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, the
Court balanced the potential injury against the possible benefits that could occur if
the Court were to extend the rule. Id. at 349. The Court first noted that applying the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would seriously obstruct the function of
the grand jury-what in effect would be occurring would be a preliminary trial on the
merits. Id. at 349, 350. The Court explained that allowing grand jury witnesses to
invoke the exclusionary rule would result in prolonged interruptions of grand jury
proceedings. Id. (quoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 70 (1972) (White,J.,
concurring)).
With regard to the benefits that could be incurred as a result of the exclusionary
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The Court reasoned that questions rendered during grand
jury proceedings on the basis of illegally obtained evidence worked
no new Fourth Amendment wrong; rather, such questions were a
derivative use stemming from the product of a prior unreasonable
search and seizure. 78 As opposed to the uses of evidence that were
applicable to a defendant in a criminal trial, the Court stated that
unlike a grand jury proceeding, derivative use of illegally seized
evidence was not allowed against such a defendant. 79 The Court
concluded that the rationale extended to fruits of an unreasonable
search and seizure similarly was to be applied to the derivative use
of such evidence.8"
It was not until 1984, in United States v. Leon,8 that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule was first recognized.8 2 In
Leon, a magistrate issued a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit that the court subsequently determined to be without probable
cause. 8" The Leon Court modified the Fourth Amendment exclurule's application to grand jury proceedings, the Court determined that the benefits
were speculative and undoubtedly minimal in the advancement of the deterrence of
police misconduct. Id. at 351. The Court asserted that it would be unrealistic to think
that the application of the exclusionary rule to witnesses of grand jury proceedings
could significantly deter police misconduct, the primary purpose of the rule. Id. at
352. The Court proffered that grand jury questions based on illegally seized evidence
did not involve an "independent governmental invasion of one's person, house, papers, or effects, but rather, the unusual abridgment of personal privacy common to all
grand jury questioning." Id. at 354.
78 Id.
79 Id.

80 Id. at 354-55.

81 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
82 Id. at 926.
83 Id. at 900. In Leon, an informant told an officer of the Burbank Police Department that two individuals were selling large amounts of cocaine and methaqualone
from their home. Id. at 901. On the basis of this and additional information, the
Burbank Police Department commenced an investigation. Id. A well-trained, experienced narcotics officer of the Burbank Police Department subsequently prepared an
application for a search warrant of the respondents' residence and automobiles. Id.
at 902. A search warrant was then issued and the police recovered a large amount of
drugs. Id.
Respondents then moved to suppress the seized evidence. Id. at 903. The Court
agreed with the lower appellate court's conclusion that based on the prevailing legal
standards, the State had failed to show probable cause. Id. at 905. The court of appeals determined that the information included in the affidavit was outdated and that
the information supplied by the informant failed to satisfy the two-prong test for probable cause as set forth by the United States Supreme Court: 1) that the application
must note the underlying circumstances necessary for a magistrate to independently
judge an informant's reliability; and 2) that the affiant must give support that the
informant is credible or that the informant's information is reliable. Id. at 904;
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1969).
The Supreme Court declined to address the issue of whether probable cause was
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sionary rule somewhat to require that evidence seized by officers
acting in good faith reliance on a search warrant that is later found
to be unsupported by probable cause would not b'e deemed
4
inadmissible.

8

The Court asserted that the issue of whether the good faith
exception could be invoked was dependent upon a weighing of the
costs and benefits of the rule's application. 5 The Court proffered
that one consequence of the rule's invocation would be that some
guilty defendants could go free or receive a lesser sentence due to
a favorable plea bargain. 6 Specifically, the Court noted that the
magnitude of the exclusionary rule's application, based on an officer's good faith action, was particularly offensive to the basic principles of the criminal justice system.8 7 Recognizing that no
precedent existed for a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, the Court stipulated that there had been strong support for
the rule's modification."8 In addition, the Court recounted its
strong preference for search warrants.8 9 The Court also refuted
established under the "totality of the circumstances" test arising out of Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), because neither party had argued the issue. Leon, 468
U.S. at 905. The Court did note, however, that the affidavit submitted was more than
a "bare bones affidavit" in that the affidavit was the result of an extensive criminal
investigation. Id. at 926.
84 Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
85 Id. at 906-07.
86 Id. at 907. The Court referred to research indicating that the impact of the
exclusionary rule was insubstantial percentage-wise; the Court noted, however, that
there still existed a large number of felons who were set free due to evidence seized
against them that was, in part, a result of an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at
907-08 n.6 (citations omitted).
87 Id. at 908 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976)). The Court added
that "[ijndiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule . . .may well 'generat[e]
disrespect for the law and administration of justice.'" Id. (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at
491). Therefore, the Court concluded that application of the exclusionary rule
should be limited to those instances in which its remedial objectives could be most
effectively served. Id. (citations omitted).
88 Id. at 913. The Court noted that in prior decisions, many Justices had urged
the Court to reconsider the scope of the exclusionary rule. Id. n.11 (citing Stone, 428
U.S. at 496 (Burger, CJ., concurring); id. at 539-40 (White, J., dissenting) (propounding that where law enforcement officials have believed that a search and seizure was in
accordance with the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule should not apply);
Gates, 462 U.S. at 274 (White, J., concurring) (arguing for the clarification of the twoprong test for probable cause as set forth in Aguilarand Spinelli)).
89 Id. at 914 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)). The
Court remarked that great deference was given to a magistrate's determination of
whether probable cause existed to issue a search warrant. Id. (citing Spinelli, 393 U.S.
at 419). The Court explained that suppression would be a proper remedy if the magistrate orjudge who issued the warrant had been misled by information set forth in an
affidavit that the affiant knew or should have known to be false. Id. at 923 (citing
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978)).
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the proposition that the exclusionary rule should be imposed because of its effects on the behavior of judges and magistrates.9"
The Court first noted that the rationale behind the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct.9 ' Second, the Court proffered that no evidence existed showing thatjudges and magistrates
were inclined to ignore the commands of the Fourth Amendment
or that the extreme sanction of exclusion was a necessary punishment.92 Finally, the Court determined that the exclusionary rule's
application would not have a significant deterrent effect on the actions of the issuing judge or magistrate; rather, the alteration of
the behavior of individual police officers or their department's policies would produce a significant deterrent effect.9" The Court
concluded that suppression resulting from a defective warrant
should be granted only on a case-by-case basis and in those unusual
cases where suppression would further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.9 4 Additionally, the Court determined that utilization
of the exclusionary rule in those instances where an officer acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant could not be expected to have a deterrent effect on
such activity; rather, the exclusionary rule's purpose in deterring
Second, the Court reasoned that the good faith exception would not apply where
a magistrate was merely acting as a "rubber stamp" for the police and, therefore,
wholly abandoning his detached and neutral judicial role. Id. at 914, 923 (citing Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 111; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 328 (1979)). The
Court believed that if such a judge or magistrate was indeed acting as a "rubber
stamp," closer supervision or removal would provide a more effective remedy than
suppression of the evidence. Id. at 917-18 n.18. Additionally, the Court reasoned that
a reasonably well-trained officer who relied on such a warrant would not be acting in
good faith and, therefore, the exception would not apply. Id. at 923.
Finally, the Court stated that suppression would result in those instances where a
warrant was issued and it was determined that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, there was an insufficient showing of probable cause. Id. at 915 (citing Gates,
462 U.S. at 238). The Court stressed that sufficient information must be offered to
the magistrate so that the magistrate may determine probable cause. Id. (citing Gates,
462 U.S. at 239). The Court added that the magistrate's action could not be "'a mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others.'" Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239).
90 Id. at 916.
91 Id. The Court added that the exclusionary rule was not designed to punish
errors committed by judges and magistrates. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 916, 918. The Court commented that judges and magistrates were not
"adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake
in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them." Id. at 917.
94 Id. at 918. The Court pointed out that it was speculative to believe that exclusion would give an incentive to judicial officers to examine warrants more closely and
to give notice of suspected judicial errors. Id. at 917.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

882

[Vol. 26:866

police misconduct would rarely be served.9 5
In conjunction with United States v. Leon, 6 the Supreme Court,
in Massachusetts v. Sheppard,9 7 applied its ruling in Leon to a situation where police officers seized items on the basis of a search warrant that was subsequently invalidated as a result of a technical
error committed by the judge who issued the warrant.9" The Sheppard Court.agreed with the lower courts' findings that the officers
had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that their search
of Sheppard's residence was authorized by a legal warrant."9 Furthermore, the Court stated that it would not rule that an officer is
to disbelieve a judge who has just informed him that the warrant
he will be using is valid for the search he has requested.'0 0 Thus,
the Court declined to invoke the exclusionary rule. 01 The Court
indicated that the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule
would not be served by suppressing evidence where a judge failed
to make the necessary technical corrections. 0 2
The Supreme Court further limited the scope of the exclu95 Id. at 919, 926. The Court opined that penalizing the police officer for the
magistrate's error would not "logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Id. at 921.
96 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
97 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
98 Id. at 983-84. In Sheppard,Detective Peter O'Malley of the Boston Police Department drafted an affidavit in support of an application for a warrant authorizing a
search of a murder suspect's home. Id. at 984. O'Malley utilized another warrant
form from another district because he had difficulty in locating a warrant application
form. Id. at 985. This form, however, had the phrase "controlled substance" in its
subtitle. Id. O'Malley deleted this subtitle from the warrant application form; he
failed, however, to delete the reference to "controlled substance" in the warrant application portion of the form. Id. O'Malley disclosed the changes and deletions that
had been made to the judge who was considering the warrant. Id. at 986. The judge
then informed O'Malley that he would effect the necessary changes so as to constitute
a proper search warrant. Id.
When the judge returned the documents to O'Malley, the judge told him that
"the warrant was sufficient authority in form and content to carry out the search as
requested"; unknown to O'Malley, however, the proper technical changes were not
made. Id. As a result of the search warrant, items that were listed in the affidavit, as
well as many other incriminating pieces of evidence, were seized by the Boston Police
Department. Id. at 987 (footnote omitted). Sheppard was subsequently charged with
first-degree murder. Id.
99 Id. at 988 (citing Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 441 N.E.2d 725, 733 (Mass.
1982); 441 N.E.2d at 745 (Lynch, J., dissenting)). The Court remarked that the officers had taken "every step that could reasonably be expected of them." Id. at 989.
100 Id. at 989-90. The Court commented: "If an officer is required to accept at face
value the judge's conclusion that a warrant form is invalid, there is little reason why
he should be expected to disregard assurances that everything is all right, especially
when he has alerted the judge to the potential problems." Id. at 990.

101 Id. at 991.
102

Id. at 990-91. The Court acknowledged that a constitutional error may have
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sionary rule in Illinois v. Krull,1°3 by ruling that suppression would
be unjustified in the case where an officer conducts a search in
objectively reasonable reliance on a statute that is subsequently determined to be unconstitutional.1 0 4 Krullinvolved a police officer's
warrantless search, authorized by statute, of the business records of
an automobile wrecking yard." 5 The Court determined that the
analysis set forth in Leon was applicable to the facts before it because the same slight deterrent effect on an officer's action would
occur if the exclusionary rule was imposed
due to an officer relying
10 6
on either a search warrant or a statute.
The Krull Court remarked that an officer could not be expected to question the legislature's judgment in enacting the law,
and furthermore, there was no evidence indicating that application
of the exclusionary rule to Evans's situation would have a significant deterrent effect. 10 7 Moreover, the Court stated that when
been committed; it noted, however, that the critical mistake was made by the judge,
not the police officers. Id. at 990.
103 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
104 Id. at 349-50.
105 Id. at 343. Pursuant to the Illinois Vehicle Code, "[a] person who sells motor
vehicles, or deals in automotive parts, or processes automotive scrap metal, or engages
in a similar business must obtain a license from the Illinois Secretary of State." Id. at
342 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 5-101, 5-102, 5-301 (1985)). In the
present case, Krull was the holder of such a license. Id. at 343. In 1981, the statute
gave state officials the right to inspect a licensee's records at any reasonable time, as
well as the authority to inspect the premises of the licensee's place of business. Id.
(citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 5-401(e) (1981)) (footnote omitted).
In Kru/, a police officer had asked to examine the licenses and vehicle purchase
records of respondent's business. Id. The officer then requested and received permission to inspect the cars located in the wrecking yard. Id. The officer was able to
ascertain that three of the vehicles were stolen and that the identification number of
another vehicle had been removed. Id. The officer seized the four vehicles and respondents were subsequently arrested and charged with violating the Illinois Vehicle
Code. Id. at 343-44.
106 Id. at 349.
107 Id. at 349-50, 351-52. The Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment violations
would not be deterred in situations where an officer "simply fulfilled his responsibility
to enforce the statute as written." Id. at 350. Additionally, the Court noted that the
legislature's purpose in the criminal justice system was to enact laws furthering that
system's goals. Id. at 351. The Court proffered that because state legislatures are
bound by oath to uphold the Constitution, courts presume that the actions of the
legislature are carried out in a constitutional manner. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 3; McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); 1 NoRMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRucrION § 2.01 (Callaghan 4th ed. 1985)).
The Court acknowledged that there could be some legislators who were politically
and zealously motivated to enact a statute that was unconstitutional; however, the
Court reasoned that if that were the case, little deterrence would result by applying
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 352 n.8.
Furthermore, the Court stated that the legislature enacted statutes "for broad,
programmatic purposes, not for the purpose of procuring evidence in particular
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weighing the possibility of some incremental deterrence against
the extreme societal detriment of exclusion, suppression could not
be justified. 1 8
The Court commented that a person subject to a statute that
authorized searches without a warrant could, prior to the search
occurring, bring a declaratory action seeking a ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, unlike the case where a person is
searched pursuant to a warrant.1"9 Similar to Leon, the Court
noted that if the legislature wholly abandoned its role by enacting
laws that were violative of the Constitution, then no objectively reasonable reliance on the resulting statute could be justified.1 ° Accordingly, the Krull Court determined that the police officer relied
on the particular statute in an objectively reasonable manner. 11
Against this backdrop of challenges to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court, in
Arizona v. Evans,1 12 confronted the issue of whether evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as a result of an erroneous
computer record, was within the scope of the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule and, therefore, admissible in court."1 '
Before it could reach its decision, however, the Court needed to
address the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to review a state
criminal investigations." Id.at 352. The Court noted that no evidence supported the
proposition that the legislature had enacted a significant amount of statutes that allowed warrantless administrative searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 351.
108 Id. at 352-53 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07). The Court found unpersuasive
the argument that a different outcome should result in a case where a statute that
authorized warrantless administrative searches affected an entire industry, as opposed
to a defective warrant that only affected one person. Id.at 353.
109 Id. at 354.
110 Id.at 355. Additionally, the Court noted that if the provisions of a statute were

so clear that a reasonable officer should know that it was unconstitutional, then no
good faith reliance would exist. Id.
111 Id.at 356-57. In support of its determination, the Court recounted prior decisions that had declared legislative schemes authorizing "warrantless administrative
searches of heavily regulated industries" constitutional. Id. at 357 (citing Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972);
Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970)).
. Additionally, the Court referenced the Illinois Supreme Court's determination
that "the licensing and inspection scheme furthered a strong public interest, for it
helped to 'facilitate the discovery and prevention of automobile thefts."' Id.at 358
(citing People v. Krull, 481 N.E.2d 703, 707 (IIl. 1985)). The Court pointed out that
the statute put licensees on notice that inspections of their businesses would occur.
Id.at 359.
112 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
113 Id. at 1189.
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court's decision that rested primarily on federal law.114
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began the
analysis by focusing on Evans's argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction" 5 because the Arizona Supreme Court had rendered its
decision on the basis of state law 1 6 and not federal law."17 The
majority first reaffirmed its holding in Michigan v. Long," 8 in which
state courts were given the absolute freedom to grant greater protection to individual rights under provisions of state constitutions
as opposed to similar federal constitutional provisions."' The
ChiefJustice recognized that state courts would continue to be free
to serve as "experimental laboratories,"2' in the sense that they
would continue to seek solutions to law enforcement problems
caused by the inescapable proliferation of computerization. 2 ' The
Court restated the requirement that, in certain instances, state
22
courts are mandated to interpret the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court concluded that because it was the final decision maker on issues regarding federal law, it did indeed possess
jurisdiction to decide whether the evidence seized during Evans's
arrest fell within the scope of the good faith exception to the exclu23
sionary rule.1
114

Id.

115 Id. Evans claimed that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the Court lacked jurisdicSTAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (1993)). This statute states, in pertinent part, that the Supreme Court may review judgments rendered by a state's
highest court when the validity of a United States statute is challenged or when the
constitutionality of a state statute is being challenged. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1993).
116 See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (West 1989) (Arizona's good faith statute).
117 Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1189. Evans also requested, in the alternative, that the case
be remanded for clarification to the Arizona Supreme Court. Id.
118 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
119 Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1190. In Long, the Court ruled that if a state court opinion
discusses both federal and state law the state court will be deemed to have relied on
federal law, absent a plain statement that the state court is rendering its decision on
the basis of state law. 463 U.S. at 1041.
120 Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1190. The majority used this phrase in the way that Justice
Brandeis used it in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. Id. (citing
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(propounding that a state may serve as a laboratory, experimenting with novel social
and economic ideas, without risk to the remaining states)).
121 Id.
122 Id. (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 297 (1821)).
123 Id. at 1189, 1190. The Court pointed out that the Arizona Supreme Court had
based its decision on its interpretation of federal law, that is, on Leon. Id. Therefore,
the Court concluded that the fact that the supreme court did not state that it was
using Leon solely for guidance purposes or the fact that Leon did not compel it to
reach the result that it did, meant that the supreme court's decision was based
"squarely upon its interpretation of federal law." Id. at 1190-91 (citing Evans, 866 P.2d
at 872; Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41).

tion. Id. (citing ARiz. REv.
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Next, the majority noted that there was no provision within
the text of the Fourth Amendment expressly precluding the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of its commands.1 2 4 The
Court made reference to its long-standing view that the applicability of the exclusionary rule was a separate and distinct issue from
whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. 2 5 The majority emphasized that the rationale of the exclusionary rule was
124 Id. at 1191 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906). In explaining the commands of the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court quoted from the text of the Fourth
Amendment:
"[t]
he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
The Court noted that an unlawful search or seizure itself breached the commands of the Fourth Amendment. Id. In support of its view, the Court added, "the
use of the fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure 'work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."' Id.
125 Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)). The majority debated
Evans's declaration that pursuant to United States v. Hensley, the evidence obtained as a
result of his arrest had to be suppressed because Hensley had incurred a Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. at 1192 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 236
(1985)). The Chief Justice pointed out that in Hensley, it was held that evidence
seized pursuant to a Teny stop was admissible because the arresting officers acted in
"objectively reasonable reliance on a flyer that had been issued by officers of another
police department who possessed a reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop." Id.
(citing Hensey, 499 U.S. at 231). A Terry stop occurs when a police officer is justified
in stopping and frisking a person suspected of participating in a criminal activity.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
The Supreme Court remarked that the Hensley Court concluded that no Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred and, as a result, the Hensey Court never addressed the issue of whether the evidence obtained should have been excluded. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1192 (citing HensLey, 469 U.S. at 236). The Court stressed that the
Hensley ruling did not contradict the Court's earlier pronouncements that the applicability of the exclusionary rule was a separate and distinct issue from whether a Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred. Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 223; Stone, 428 U.S.
at 486-87; Calandra,414 U.S. at 348).
The Court also refuted Evans's argument that the reasoning in Whiteley v. Warden,
mandated that the Court suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrest. Id. at
1192 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)). The Supreme Court recounted the facts of Whiteley, in which Harold Whiteley was arrested as a result of a
radio bulletin stating that a robbery had occurred. Id. (citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at
568-69). The Whiteley Court concluded that Whiteley's Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated because the basis of his arrest warrant "was insufficient to support an
independent judicial assessment of probable cause." Id. (citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at
568-69).
The Supreme Court in Evans acknowledged that the Whiteley decision had precedential value with regard to whether police officers had violated the Fourth Amendment; the majority, however, criticized the Whiteley decision for not being consistent
with prior case law interpreting the exclusionary rule. Id.
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one of deterrence-ajudicially-created remedy attempting
to pre126
vent future violations of the Fourth Amendment.
In criticizing the Arizona Supreme Court's holding as being
contrary to the reasoning of prior United States Supreme Court
decisions, 127 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained three factors used
by the Court in determining whether to apply the exclusionary
rule. 2 The ChiefJustice first noted that the exclusionary rule was
historically designed to deter police misconduct and not judicial
errors. 29 Next, the majority proffered that there was no evidence
indicating that judges or magistrates were prone to violating the
Fourth Amendment.1 3 0 Finally, the Court determined that the
most important factor was that there was no support for the theory
that the exclusion of evidence, obtained as a result of a warrant,
would serve to deter negligent conduct of court employees responsible for notifying the police that a warrant had been quashed. 3 '
The majority stressed that as a result of the marginal or nonexistent benefits that arose out of the suppression of evidence seized in
objectively reasonable reliance on what appeared to be a facially
valid warrant, the substantial cost of exclusion could not be justified."3 2 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
126 Id. at 1191 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Calandra,414 U.S. at 348). The Court
recognized that the application of the exclusionary rule had been limited to those
situations in which its goal of deterrence was most effectively served. Id. (citing Leon,
468 U.S. at 908; Calandra,414 U.S. at 348).
127 The Evans Court stated that the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court went
against the Court's prior reasoning in Leon, Sheppard, and Krull. Id. at 1191-92.
128 Id. In support of its reasoning, the Supreme Court submitted that its approach
was consistent with the dissentingJustices' opinion in Krull Id. at 1193 (citing Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 361-69 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). The Evans Court
opined that all of the Justices in Krull agreed that Leon demonstrated the proper
framework to be utilized in determining whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. Id. (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
129 Id. at 1191 (citing Krull 480 U.S. at 340, 348). The Court hypothesized that
even if employees of the justice court were responsible for the erroneous computer
record, suppressing illegally obtained evidence would not deter future errors from
occurring. Id. at 1193. The Court explained that the severe sanction of suppression
could not be justified in such a case. Id.
130 Id. at 1191 (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 348). The Court highlighted the Chief
Clerk of the Justice Court's testimony, which stated that the type of error in the present case occurred "once every three or four years." Id. at 1193-94 (citation omitted).
131 Id. at 1193. The majority contended that because court clerks were not "adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime," they did not have a stake in the outcome of certain criminal
prosecutions. Id. (citingJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
132 Id. at 1192 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). The Court continued to emphasize
that the exclusion of evidence would not serve to alter the already existing good faith
conduct of law enforcement officers orjudges. Id. at 1191-92 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at
919-20); Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984)). The Chief Justice
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evidence seized pursuant to an arrest based upon a police officer's
computer record, which failed to indicate that the arrest warrant
had been quashed, was within the good faith exception to the ex13 3
clusionary rule.
Justice O'Connor,joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, filed a
concurring opinion, stressing that the majority's decision was limited to the holding that the exclusionary rule was applicable to a
court employee's departure from established recordation procedures with regard to the removal of an arrest warrant from a computer system after the arrest warrant had been quashed.13 ' The
Justice maintained that the Court's holding in the present case did
not profess that the exclusionary rule would apply only to the type
of mistake that may have been committed by the justice court employee.1 3 5 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that although the
Phoenix Police Department was not at fault for the court employee's mistake, the Department may36or may not have reasonably
relied on the recording system itself.1
In comparing recording systems with informants, Justice
O'Connor posited that the reliability of recordkeeping systems did
not deserve lesser scrutiny than that which is applied to informants. 13 7 The Justice proffered that unlike a search and arrest, a
subsequent determination that an informant was mistaken would
not defeat a finding of probable cause. 38 Justice O'Connor recognized that the proliferation of powerful computerized recording
systems has resulted in the facilitation of arrests in ways that previrestated the trial court's finding that Officer Sargent would have been derelict in his
duties had he not arrested Evans based on what appeared at the time to be a valid
outstanding arrest warrant. Id. at 1193 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920).
133 Id. at 1189.
134 Id. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor clarified that the majority's holding reaffirmed the view that the societal costs incurred as a result of the
exclusionary rule's application were so significant that the exclusionary rule should
be applied only in those instances where its deterrence purposes would be most effectively served. Id. (citing Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191).
'35 Id.
136 Id. TheJustice explained that it would be unreasonable for a police department
to rely on a recording system that did not have a device to ensure its accuracy or to
rely on a system that consistently led to false arrests. Id.
137 Id. In support of its comparison, the Justice recounted the Court's decision in
Illinois v. Gates, in which it stated that information provided by an informant, who did
not specify upon what his knowledge was based, would not support a probable cause
finding unless such an informant was known for his unusual reliability. Id. (citing
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983); United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 39-40
n.1 (5th Cir. 1973)).
138 Id.
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ously would have never been possible."3 9 Acknowledging that law
enforcement officials were obviously entitled to utilize technological advances, Justice O'Connor warned that these officials were not
to rely on this technology blindly; rather, the benefits of such advances had to be utilized in conjunction with upholding citizens'
constitutional rights.14 °
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a brief concurrence. 14 1 The Justice clarified that the majority's holding did not
reach the issue of how far the deterrence rationale should be extended to the entire government with regard to computer errors. 142 The Justice noted that without this limitation, there would

not otherwise be any reasonable expectation of maintaining a mini1 43
mum amount of acceptable false arrests.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting
opinion.1

44

The Justice began the analysis by declaring that the

Court should abandon the presumption set forth in Michigan v.
Long, 4 5 which dictates that if a state court opinion discusses both
federal and state law the state court will be deemed to have relied
on federal law, absent a plain statement that the state court is rendering its decision on the basis of state law. 146 Justice Ginsburg
proffered that the Long ruling obstructed the state courts' abilities

142

Id. at 1195 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.

143

Id.

189
140

141

144 Id. at 1197 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
145 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
146 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1198 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 104041). Justice Ginsburg noted the significance of the state courts' decision of whether
to use a plain statement of intent setting forth that it will be rendering its decision on
an independent state ground. Id. at 1201 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Justice
stated that "[t] he [Michigan v. Long] presumption is an imperfect barometer of state
courts' intent." Id. Acknowledging that all a state court had to say was "the requisite
magic words" in order to invoke the plain statement option, the Justice pointed out
that its application was contingent upon a "series of 'soft' requirements: the -state
decision must 'fairly appear' to rest 'primarily' on federal law or be 'interwoven' with
federal law, and the independence of the state ground must be 'not clear' from the
face of the state opinion." Id. (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 552 (3d ed. 1988)).
Justice Ginsburg questioned whether a State's highest court could satisfy Long's
plain statement requirement by merely setting forth a blanket disclaimer that all future decisions will be deemed to rest on an independent state ground. Id. (citing
State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983) (where the New Hampshire Supreme
Court declared that future decisions in which the court cites "'federal or other State
court opinions in construing provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution or statutes'" shall be deemed to have relied on such citations for guidance purposes only
and, therefore, not bound by such decisions)). The Justice concluded that the deci-
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to serve as experimental laboratories in resolving novel questions
of law, and, therefore, in the present case, the Court should dismiss
the writ of certiorari and assume the opposite of the plain state1 47
ment rule set forth in Leon.
Refuting the majority's contention that the Arizona Supreme
Court had based its decision on its interpretation of federal law,
meaning Leon, the Justice contrarily asserted that the supreme
court did not rely on Leon; in fact, the Justice pointed out, the
supreme court did not even find Leon helpful. 1 48 Justice Ginsburg
opined that the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized that the electronic age posed new dangers to individual liberty and, as a result,
suppression of evidence that would not have been obtained but for
computer errors would reduce the chances of incorrect records existing in the future.' 4 9
Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's reasoning that
because court clerks were not annexed to the field of law enforcement, the application of the exclusionary rule to Evans's situation
would not have a significant effect on employees of the court who
sion in Long simply shifted, in advance, the burden of clarification to state courts. Id.
at 1202 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 1198, 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg added that it
should be presumed that the Arizona Supreme Court "ruled for its own State and
people, under its own constitutional recognition of individual security against unwarranted state intrusion." Id. at 1198 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). In explaining the opposite of the plain statement rule, Justice Ginsburg believed that the presumption
should be that a state court's decision, such as that in the present case, rests on independent state law grounds absent any statements to the contrary. Id. at 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
148 Id. at 1198 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984); State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
Justice Ginsburg interpreted the Arizona Supreme Court's decision as having focused
on the harsh effect on one's personal liberty when an arrest warrant is executed. Id.
149 Id. (citing Evans, 866 P.2d at 872). The Justice indicated that the Arizona
Supreme Court "recognized the 'potential for Orwellian mischief' in the government's increasing reliance on computer technology in law enforcement." Id. In recognizing that computer errors accompanied the many benefits of computer
technology, Justice Ginsburg mentioned the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's)
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to demonstrate that inaccurate data in
the NCIC would affect law enforcement agencies nationwide. Id. at 1199 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
Additionally, the Justice observed that Evans's situation was not idiosyncratic. Id.
Justice Stevens found affirmation for this view in Rogan v. Los Angeles, in which an
arrest warrant had been entered into the NCIC computer for a Terry Dean Rogan;
the real criminal suspect, however, had been impersonating Rogan. Id. (citing Rogan
v. Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987)). Justice Ginsburg added that no
physical description of the real suspect existed in the computer records. Id. Justice
Ginsburg's dissent pointed out that Rogan had been arrested four times, "three times
at gunpoint," for minor traffic violations. Id. at 1199-1201 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Rogan, 668 F. Supp. at 1389) (other citations omitted).
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were responsible for notifying the police once a warrant had been
quashed.' 50 Noting that police officers and court personnel were
not comparably computerized in this age of computer technology,
specifically with regard to recordkeeping, the Justice asserted that
applying the exclusionary rule to the present case, as the Arizona
Supreme Court reasonably held, would serve as an incentive to the
State to maintain current computer records.' 5 '
Justice Ginsburg proffered that the Court should allow the
states to serve as experimental laboratories in an attempt to discover different avenues that could be utilized in an effort to maintain respect for the rights of individuals in modern society.15 2 The
Justice argued that in the present case, there was no aspect of federalism that dealt with a state court interpreting state law; the Justice therefore concluded that the Court should not place itself too
deeply in an area that had been traditionally regulated by the
53
states.1
In examining prior decisions in which the Court ruled that a
state court had not rendered its decision on an independent state
ground, Justice Ginsburg pointed out the increasing frequency
with which state courts, on remand, reinstate their priorjudgments
after having clarified that their original decision rested on state
grounds.' 5 4 The Justice criticized the Court's findings in Michigan
150 Id. at 1200 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). TheJustice noted that the premise stating
that the exclusionary rule cannot deter carelessness is defeated by the presumption
that imposing liability for negligence serves as an incentive for people to be more
careful. Id. n.5. Regardless of whether the mistake in the case at bar was committed
by a clerical worker, Justice Ginsburg professed, the suppression of evidence would
provide an incentive to system managers to more closely monitor their personnel's
use of such systems, similar to what occurs in the employer/employee context as evident in the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.
151 Id. at 1200. TheJustice contended that the incentive to maintain efficient court
computer records would be lessened if such records were exempt from the exclusionary rule. Id.
152 Id. at 1200-01 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg explained that historically, prior to the Court ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
Bill of Rights, "state constitutional rights, as interpreted by state courts, imposed the
primary constraints on state action." Id. at 1201 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARv. L.
Rxv. 489, 501-02 (1977)).

Id.
154 Id. at 1202 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Richard W. Westling, Comment,
153

Advisory Opinions and the "Constitutionally Required" Adequate and Independent State
Grounds Doctrine, 63 TUL. L. REv. 379, 389-90 n.47 (1988) (stating that prior to the
Long ruling, two out of fourteen cases involving a question of independent state
grounds were, upon remand, reinstated upon state grounds; after Long, four out of
fifteen decisions were reinstated upon remand)). The Justice further pointed out
that prior to Long,
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v. Long 55 because the decision went against the traditional principle that the Court will not rule on constitutional issues if there is
an alternative court that can just as fairly render a decision.15 6 Justice Ginsburg recognized that precedent, such as the Supreme
Court's ruling in Long, should only be overruled if strong cause
could be shown. 15 7 The Justice reasoned that by allowing the Long
plain statement ruling to be abandoned, the Court would not be
asserting its authority in areas reserved to the states' domain,1 5 8
and it would instead be avoiding premature decisions made on important federal questions.1 59
In dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Ginsburg that
the majority's ruling was premature because it still had a great deal
to learn about the effects of computer errors.1 60 Justice Stevens
asserted that the Court's holding would have its most serious impact on the citizen who is stopped for a minor traffic violation and
is subsequently arrested as a result of erroneous computer information indicating an existing outstanding warrant. 161 The Justice
occurring was
proffered that the only way to deter such errors from
1 62
rule.
exclusionary
the
of
application
through the
In maintaining that the cost of suppressing the evidence
seized incident to Evans's arrest had to offset the protection of in"the traditional presumption was that the Court lacked jurisdiction unless its authority to review was clear on the face of the state court opinion. When faced with uncertainty, the Court in the past occasionally
remanded such cases to the state court for clarification. But more commonly, the Court would deny jurisdiction where there was uncertainty."
Id. (quoting GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (12th ed. 1991)). Justice
Ginsburg commented that the Court unnecessarily asserted its authority on matters
that could have initially been left to the state courts. Id.
155 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
156 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1202 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Ashwander v. Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
157

Id.

158 Id.
159 Id.

160 Id. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (citing Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1200-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Justice Stevens added that the police officer who arrests someone as a result of erroneous computer information, as well as the police officer's employer, would be immune from
civil liability. Id. (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663-64
(1978)) (footnote omitted).
162 Id. Justice Stevens noted that, historically, warrants place "'the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer.'" Id. (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
363 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). The Justice charged that the "offense to the
dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street
simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer data
base strikes me as equally outrageous." Id.
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nocent citizens from unwarranted indignity, Justice Stevens determined that suppression of the evidence was significantly balanced
against a jealous regard for maintaining the soundness of individual rights. 6 3 The Justice disagreed with the majority's assumption
that the purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule is limited to deterring police misconduct." Justice
Stevens explained that the history and text of the Fourth Amendment demonstrates that the Amendment's rationale is to protect
persons from all unreasonable searches and seizures. 165 In stating
that Fourth Amendment violations imposed costs on the government, Justice Stevens professed that in an attempt to avoid future
violations, the government is thereby motivated to train its
166
employees.
Next, the Justice refuted the majority's reference that the exclusionary rule was an extreme sanction. 16 7 Justice Stevens explained that a court's application of the exclusionary rule simply
placed the government back in the position in which it would have
been but for the illegal search and seizure. 1" 8 The Justice concluded that because Evans's arrest was in clear violation of the Constitution, it was not extreme for the Arizona Supreme Court to
exclude the evidence seized incident to the arrest. 69 Justice Stevens claimed that the majority's reliance on United States v. Leon was
misplaced because the Court's reasoning in Leon was applicable to
cases involving a warrant, whereas in the case at bar, a warrantless
search and seizure was at issue.17 0 The Justice concluded that the
Id.
Id. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. The Justice stressed that the Fourth Amendment's application was not limited to certain agents of the government, but, rather, its application was to the government as a whole. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-79 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Specifically, Justice Stevens remarked that the deterrence
rationale behind the exclusionary rule applied not only to the arresting police officer,
but to the entire field of law enforcement. Id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Stewart, supra note 3, at 1400).
167 Id. (referring to Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1191).
168 Id. (citing Stewart, supra note 3, at 1392). Justice Stevens recognized the majority's contention that the application of the exclusionary rule was a separate and distinct issue from whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. Id. The
Justice, however, recalled several decisions by the Court in which the opposite view
was expressed. Id. n.1 (citing Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191, 1192; Whiteley v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560, 568-69 (1971); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 477-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
169 Id. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice explained that the ruling in
Leon was limited to the proposition that in cases where police officers rely on a facially
valid warrant that is later found to be invalid, courts need not look to the judges and
163

164
165
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Leon rationale neither extended to the time period after a warrant
had been issued nor to employees responsible for functions of the
171
court.
The Justice charged that the majority overlooked the significance that its ruling would have on citizens' security.1 7 2 The Justice
further criticized the Court for its failure to recognize that during
the past fifty years, computers have altered the nature of threats
with regard to the privacy of citizens. 173 Justice Stevens concluded
that the only Fourth Amendment violations that were ever documented and rectified were those that resulted in an unlawful
arrest. 174
Throughout its recent decisions, the United States Supreme
Court has continued to uphold the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule; 175 as a result, the scope of the exclusionary rule
has been narrowed accordingly.1 76 The Court has recognized that
unless the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence has the potential
to deter future law enforcement misconduct, the denial of the supmagistrates responsible for the error because they are unaffected by the deterrence
rationale. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 916).
171 Id. Justice Stevens noted that some court employees may have more consistent
contact with police than with judges or magistrates. Id. Noting that the rationale
behind the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct systematically, Justice Stevens asserted that it could be reasonably presumed that because officials in law enforcement were in a better position to monitor clerical errors, these officials could
work to prevent such errors from occurring in the future. Id. (citing Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 221 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "EmpiricalProposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 659-62
(1983); Stewart, supra note 3, at 1400). In illustrating how the exclusionary rule
serves to deter police misconduct systematically, Justice Stevens noted that in the present case, the Phoenix Police Department was a link in the chain of information that
ultimately led to Evans's warrantless arrest. Id.
172 Id. The Justice mentioned the Chief Clerk's testimony at the evidentiary hearing at which she testified that errors similar to what had transpired in the present case
occurred approximately once "'every three or four years."' Id. (citing Evans, 115 S.
Ct. at 1193-94). Justice Stevens interpreted the Chief Clerk's testimony as slim evidence for the conclusion that computer errors were not a noticeable threat to Fourth
Amendment interests. Id. at 1196-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
173 Id. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174 Id. In support of this observation, Justice Stevens quoted from Justice Jackson's
dissenting opinion in Brinegarv. United States: "'There may be, and I am convinced
that there are[ ] many unlawful searches ... of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and
about which we never hear."' Id; (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
175 See generally Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340 (1987); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
176 Id.
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pression of such evidence must occur. 7 7
As law enforcement departments increasingly continue to rely
on electronic technology for determining whether outstanding
arrest warrants exist, 1 7 it is impossible for anyone to guarantee
that no mistakes will be made in the maintenance of such records.
If the seized evidence was obtained in good faith reliance by a law
enforcement official, it is unlikely that deterrence of such a mistake, if any, would result from the evidence's exclusion.1 79 Furthermore, it would be absurd and impractical to require every police
officer who has knowledge of an outstanding arrest warrant to exhaust all possible mistakes, both reasonable and unreasonable, in
the execution of an arrest warrant.
The exclusionary rule is an appropriate judicially-created rem8
edy ' because it is the best attempt available to remedy those unfortunate citizens whose constitutional rights have been violated by
the government. The bottom line of any case should be to reach
its merits. By applying a strict application of the exclusionary rule,
criminals who would otherwise be subject to incriminating evidence would ultimately be set free because of a court official's mistake. Surely, this is not what is meant by justice. Although there
will be those innocent parties who will conceivably have their
Fourth Amendment rights violated, the cost is minimal when compared to the great injustice that would occur if an otherwise guilty
party could be set free.
Currently, congressional legislation is pending as to the creation of a statutory good faith exception to the exclusionary rule."'1
The United States Senate has acknowledged the need to codify the
exclusionary rule's good faith exception that has been consistently
recognized by the Court. It is likely that the Members of Congress
had their constituents in mind and determined that the vast major177 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 926.
178 Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (O'Connor, J.,
179 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 926.

dissenting).

180 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
181 See Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995, S. 54, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1995). This Act provides, in pertinent part:
Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure shall not be
excluded ... on the ground that the search or seizure was in violation of
the [F]ourth [A] mendment... if the search or seizure was undertaken
in an objectively reasonable belief that it was in conformity with the
fourth amendment. A showing that evidence was obtained pursuant to
and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of
such a reasonable belief, unless that warrant was obtained through intentional and material misrepresentation.
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ity of Americans are willing to sacrifice a small part of their liberty
interest in an attempt to fully punish those guilty of criminal
conduct.
ChristineA. Haberle

